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TheStructureofaGeneralTheoryofIntentionality
Inthissection,weconsiderhowageneraltheoryofintentionalitywouldlookwithin PIRP.Aswesawin §1,withinNERPthegeneraltheoryofintentionalitycanbeseen asinvolvingtwochapters:thetheoryofsourceintentionalityandthetheoryofnonsourceintentionality.ThesamegeneralstructurecanbereplicatedwithinPIRP.
SincewithinPIRPphenomenalintentionalityisthesourceintentionality,within
PRIPageneraltheoryofintentionalitywouldcomprisetwochapters,thetheoryof phenomenalintentionalityandthetheoryofnon-phenomenalintentionality. 13 One could embrace this positive metaphysical position about physicalistic naturalizability while yet embracing a negative epistemological position about the prospects for humankind ever producing such a naturalization. For instance, one could agree with Levine (refs) both that (1) phenomenal consciousness is a physicalistically kosher phenomenon, and also (2) that there is an "explanatory gap" concerning the physical/phenomenal interface that at present looks intractable. Or one could go further in one's epistemological pessimism, by agreeing with McGinn (refs) that not only are (1) and (2) true, but furthermore (3) certain innate cognitive limitations make it impossible for the explanatory gap to be closeable in a way that humans could ever articulate or understand. 
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